Introduction
Distributed networks have received much attention in the last year because of their flexibility and computational performance. The ability to coordinate agents is important in many real-world tasks where it is necessary for agents to exchange information with each other. Synchronization behavior among agents is found in flocking of birds, schooling of fish, and other natural systems. Work has been done to develop cooperative control methods for consensus and synchronization (Fax and Murray, 2004; Jadbabaie, Lin and Morse, 2003; Olfati-Saber, and Murray, 2004; Qu, 2009; Ren, Beard, and Atkins, 2005; Ren, and Beard, 2008; Tsitsiklis, 1984) . See (Olfati-Saber, Fax, and Murray, 2007; Ren, Beard, and Atkins, 2005) for surveys. Leaderless consensus results in all nodes converging to common value that cannot generally be controlled. We call this the cooperative regulator problem. On the other hand the problem of cooperative tracking requires that all nodes synchronize to a leader or control node (Hong, Hu, and Gao, 2006; Li, Wang, and Chen, 2004; Ren, Moore, and Chen, 2007; Wang, and Chen, 2002) . This has been called pinning control or control with a virtual leader. Consensus has been studied for systems on communication graphs with fixed or varying topologies and communication delays.
Game theory provides an ideal environment in which to study multi-player decision and control problems, and offers a wide range of challenging and engaging problems. Game theory (Tijs, 2003) has been successful in modeling strategic behavior, where the outcome for each player depends on the actions of himself and all the other players. Every player chooses a control to minimize independently from the others his own performance objective. Multi player cooperative games rely on solving coupled Hamilton-Jacobi (HJ) equations, which in the linear quadratic case reduce to the coupled algebraic Riccati equations (Basar, and Olsder, 1999; Freiling, Jank, and Abou-Kandil, 2002; Gajic, and Li, 1988) . Solution methods are generally offline and generate fixed control policies that are then implemented in online controllers in real time. These coupled equations are difficult to solve.
Reinforcement learning (RL) is a sub-area of machine learning concerned with how to methodically modify the actions of an agent (player) based on observed responses from its environment (Sutton, and Barto, 1998) . RL methods have allowed control systems researchers to develop algorithms to learn online in real time the solutions to optimal control problems for dynamic systems that are described by difference or ordinary differential equations. These involve a computational intelligence technique known as Policy Iteration (PI) (Bertsekas, and Tsitsiklis, 1996) , which refers to a class of algorithms with two steps, policy evaluation and policy improvement. PI has primarily been developed for discrete-time systems, and online implementation for control systems has been developed through approximation of the value function (Bertsekas, and Tsitsiklis, 1996; Werbos, 1974; Werbos, 1992) . PI provides effective means of learning solutions to HJ equations online. In control theoretic terms, the PI algorithm amounts to learning the solution to a nonlinear Lyapunov equation, and then updating the policy through minimizing a Hamiltonian function. Policy Iteration techniques have been developed for continuous-time systems in (Vrabie, Pastravanu, Lewis, and Abu-Khalaf, 2009 ).
RL methods have been used to solve multiplayer games for finite-state systems in (Busoniu, Babuska, and De Schutter, 2008; Littman, 2001) . RL methods have been applied to learn online in real-time the solutions for optimal control problems for dynamic systems and differential games in (Dierks, and Jagannathan, 2010; Johnson, Hiramatsu, Fitz-Coy, and Dixon, 2010; Vamvoudakis 2010; Vamvoudakis 2011 ).
This book chapter brings together cooperative control, reinforcement learning, and game theory to solve multi-player differential games on communication graph topologies. There are four main contributions in this chapter. The first involves the formulation of a graphical game for dynamical systems networked by a communication graph. The dynamics and value function of each node depend only on the actions of that node and its neighbors. This graphical game allows for synchronization as well as Nash equilibrium solutions among neighbors. It is shown that standard definitions for Nash equilibrium are not sufficient for graphical games and a new definition of "Interactive Nash Equilibrium" is given. The second contribution is the derivation of coupled Riccati equations for solution of graphical games. The third contribution is a Policy Iteration algorithm for solution of graphical games that relies only on local information from neighbor nodes. It is shown that this algorithm converges to the best response policy of a node if its neighbors have fixed policies, and to the Nash solution if all nodes update their policies. The last contribution is the development of an online adaptive learning algorithm for computing the Nash equilibrium solutions of graphical games.
The book chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews synchronization in graphs and derives an error dynamics for each node that is influenced by its own actions and those of its neighbors. Section 3 introduces differential graphical games cooperative Nash equilibrium. Coupled Riccati equations are developed and stability and solution for Nash equilibrium are proven. Section 4 proposes a policy iteration algorithm for the solution of graphical games and gives proofs of convergence. Section 5 presents an online adaptive learning solution based on the structure of the policy iteration algorithm of Section 4. Finally Section 6 presents a simulation example that shows the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms in learning in real-time the solutions of graphical games. 
Synchronization and node error dynamics

Graphs
A directed graph is strongly connected if there is a directed path from i v to j v for all distinct nodes ,
tree is a connected digraph where every node except one, called the root, has in-degree equal to one. A graph is said to have a spanning tree if a subset of the edges forms a directed tree. A strongly connected digraph contains a spanning tree.
General directed graphs with fixed topology are considered in this chapter.
Synchronization and node error dynamics
Consider the N systems or agents distributed on communication graph G with node dynamics 
The pinning gain 0 i g  is nonzero for a small number of nodes i that are coupled directly to the leader or control node 0 x , and 0 i g  for at least one i (Li, Wang, and Chen, 2004) . We refer to the nodes i for which 0 i g  as the pinned or controlled nodes. Note that i  represents the information available to node i for state feedback purposes as dictated by the graph structure.
The state of the control or target node is 0 ( ) n x t   which satisfies the dynamics 0 0
Note that this is in fact a command generator (Lewis, 1992) and we seek to design a cooperative control command generator tracker. Note that the trajectory generator A may not be stable.
The Synchronization control design problem is to design local control protocols for all the nodes in G to synchronize to the state of the control node, i.e. one requires
From (2), the overall error vector for network Gr is given by
where the global vectors are Brewer, 1978) .
is a diagonal matrix with diagonal entries equal to the pinning gains i g . The (global) consensus or synchronization error (e.g. the disagreement vector in (Olfati-Saber, and Murray, 2004) 
The communication digraph is assumed to be strongly connected. Then, if 0
is nonsingular with all eigenvalues having positive real parts (Khoo, Xie, and Man, 2009 ). The next result therefore follows from (4) and the Cauchy Schwartz inequality and the properties of the Kronecker product (Brewer, 1978) .
Lemma 1. Let the graph be strongly connected and 0 G  . Then the synchronization error is bounded by 
■ Our objective now shall be to make small the local neighborhood tracking errors ( ) i t  , which in view of Lemma 1 will guarantee synchronization.
To find the dynamics of the local neighborhood tracking error, write
where all weighting matrices are constant and symmetric with 0, 0, 0
that the i-th performance index includes only information about the inputs of node i and its neighbors.
For dynamics (8) with performance objectives (9), introduce the associated Hamiltonians
where i p is the costate variable. Necessary conditions (Lewis, and Syrmos, 1995) for a minimum of (9) are (1) and
Graphical games
Interpreting the control inputs , i j u u as state dependent policies or strategies, the value function for node i corresponding to those policies is 
with boundary condition
The gradient is disabused here as a column vector.)
That is, solution of equation (14) serves as an alternative to evaluating the infinite integral (13) for finding the value associated to the current feedback policies. It is shown in the Proof of Theorem 2 that (14) is a Lyapunov equation. According to (13) and (10) one equates /
The local dynamics (8) and performance indices (9) only depend for each node i on its own control actions and those of its neighbors. We call this a graphical game. It depends on the topology of the communication graph
We assume throughout the chapter that the game is well-formed in the following sense.
Definition 2. The graphical game with local dynamics (8) and performance indices (9) is well-formed if 0
The control objective of agent i in the graphical game is to determine
Employing the stationarity condition (12) (Lewis, and Syrmos, 1995) one obtains the control policies
The game defined in (15) corresponds to Nash equilibrium. 
The N-tuple of game values  
The distributed multiplayer graphical game with local dynamics (8) and local performance indices (9) should be contrasted with standard multiplayer games (Abou-Kandil, Freiling, Ionescu, and Jank, 2003; Basar, and Olsder 1999) which have centralized dynamics
where n z   is the state, ( ) i m i u t   is the control input for every player, and where the performance index of each player depends on the control inputs of all other players. In the graphical games, by contrast, each node's dynamics and performance index only depends on its own state, its control, and the controls of its immediate neighbors.
It is desired to study the distributed game on a graph defined by (15) with distributed dynamics (8). It is not clear in this scenario how global Nash equilibrium is to be achieved.
Graphical games have been studied in the computational intelligence community (Kakade, Kearns, Langford, and Ortitz, 2003; Kearns, Littman, and Singh, 2001; Shoham, and LeytonBrown, 2009) . A (nondynamic) graphical game has been defined there as a tuple ( , , ) G U v
U the set of actions available to node i, and
function of node i. It is important to note that the payoff of node i only depends on its own action and those of its immediate neighbors.
The work on graphical games has focused on developing algorithms to find standard Nash equilibria for payoffs generally given in terms of matrices. Such algorithms are simplified in that they only have complexity on the order of the maximum node degree in the graph, not on the order of the number of players N. Undirected graphs are studied, and it is assumed that the graph is connected.
The intention in this chapter is to provide online real-time adaptive methods for solving differential graphical games that are distributed in nature. That is, the control protocols and adaptive algorithms of each node are allowed to depend only information about itself and its neighbors. Moreover, as the game solution is being learned, all node dynamics are required to be stable, until finally all the nodes synchronize to the state of the control node. These online methods are discussed in Section V.
The following notions are needed in the study of differential graphical games.
Definition 4. (Shoham, and Leyton-Brown, 2009 ) Agent i's best response to fixed policies i u  of his neighbors is the policy
for all policies i u of agent i.
For centralized multi-agent games, where the dynamics is given by (18) and the performance of each agent depends on the actions of all other agents, an equivalent definition of Nash equilibrium is that each agent is in best response to all other agents. In graphical games, if all agents are in best response to their neighbors, then all agents are in Nash equilibrium, as seen in the proof of Theorem 1.
However, a counterexample shows the problems with the definition of Nash equilibrium in graphical games. Consider the completely disconnected graph with empty edge set where each node has no neighbors. Then Definition 4 holds if each agent simply chooses his single-player optimal control solution Note, however, that Definition 3 also holds, that is, the nodes are in a global Nash equilibrium. Pathological cases such as this counterexample cannot occur in the standard games with centralized dynamics (18), particularly because stabilizability conditions are usually assumed.
Interactive Nash equilibrium
The counterexample in the previous section shows that in pathological cases when the graph is disconnected, agents can be in Nash equilibrium, yet have no influence on each others' games. In such situations, the definition of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (Shinohara, 2010) may also hold, that is, no set of agents has an incentive to break away from the Nash equilibrium and seek a new Nash solution among themselves.
To rule out such undesirable situations and guarantee that all agents in a graph are involved in the same game, we make the following stronger definition of global Nash equilibrium. 
for all , i k N  . That is, at equilibrium there exists a policy of every player k that influences the performance of all other players i.
If the systems are in Interactive Nash equilibrium, the graphical game is well-defined in the sense that all players are in a single Nash equilibrium with each player affecting the decisions of all other players. Condition (21) means that the reaction curve (Basar, and Olsder, 1999) of any player i is not constant with respect to all variations in the policy of any other player k.
The next results give conditions under which the local best responses in Definition 4 imply the interactive global Nash of Definition 5.
Consider the systems (8) in closed-loop with admissible feedbacks (12), (16) denoted by
The global closed-loop dynamics are 
All shortest paths to node i from node k pass through a single neighbor 1
An example case where Assumption 1a holds is when there is a single shortest path from k 
Proof:
Sufficiency. If k i  the result is obvious. Otherwise, the reachability matrix from node k to node i has the n m  block element in block row i and block column k given as
where * denotes nonzero entries. Under the assumptions, the matrix on the right has full row rank and the matrix on the left is written as
Necessity. If there is no path from node k to node i, then the control input of node k cannot influence the state or value of node i. 
Let every node i be in best response to all his neighbors
,
, Necessity. If the graph is not strongly connected, then there exist nodes k and i such that there is no path from node k to node i. Then, the control input of node k cannot influence the state or the value of node i. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium is not interactive.
Sufficiency. Let ( , )
i A B be reachable for all i N  . Then if there is a path from node k to node i, the state i  is reachable from k u , and from (9) input k u can change the value i J . Strong connectivity means there is a path from every node k to every node i and condition (21) holds for all , i k N  .
■
The reachability condition is sufficient but not necessary for Interactive Nash equilibrium.
According to the results just established, the following assumptions are made.
Assumptions 2.
a. ( , )
i A B is reachable for all i N  .
b. The graph is strongly connected and at least one pinning gain i g is nonzero. Then
Stability and solution of graphical games
Substituting control policies (16) into (14) yields the coupled cooperative game HamiltonJacobi (HJ) equations
where the closed-loop matrix is 2 1 ( ) 
There is one coupled HJ equation corresponding to each node, so solution of this N-player game problem is blocked by requiring a solution to N coupled partial differential equations.
In the next sections we show how to solve this N-player cooperative game online in a distributed fashion at each node, requiring only measurements from neighbor nodes, by using techniques from reinforcement learning.
It is now shown that the coupled HJ equations (25) can be written as coupled Riccati equations. For the global state  given in (4) we can write the dynamics as
where u is the control given by
where (.) diag denotes diagonal matrix of appropriate dimensions. Furthermore the global costate dynamics are
This is a set of coupled dynamic equations reminiscent of standard multi-player games (Basar, and Olsder, 1999) or single agent optimal control (Lewis, and Syrmos, 1995) . Therefore the solution can be written without any loss of generality as
for some matrix
Lemma 3. HJ equations (25) are equivalent to the coupled Riccati equations
or equivalently, in closed-loop form,
where P is defined by (31), and
Take (14) and write it with respect to the global state and costate as
By definition of the costate one has 1 1 ... ...
■
From the control policies (16), (34) becomes (32).
It is now shown that if solutions can be found for the coupled design equations (25), they provide the solution to the graphical game problem.
Theorem 2. Stability and Solution for Cooperative Nash Equilibrium.
Let Assumptions 1 and 2a hold. Let 
At the equilibrium point 
Proof:
From Theorems 1 and 2. 
Global and local performance objectives: Cooperation and competition
The overall objective of all the nodes is to ensure synchronization of all the states ( ) i x t to 0 ( ) x t . The multi player game formulation allows for considerable freedom of each agent while achieving this objective. Each agent has a performance objective that can embody team objectives as well as individual node objectives.
The performance objective of each node can be written as 
Policy iteration algorithms for cooperative multi-player games
Reinforcement learning (RL) techniques have been used to solve the single-player optimal control problem online using adaptive learning techniques to determine the optimal value function. Especially effective are the approximate dynamic programming (ADP) methods (Werbos, 1974; Werbos, 1992) . RL techniques have also been applied for multiplayer games with centralized dynamics (18). See for example (Busoniu, Babuska, and De Schutter, 2008; Vrancx, Verbeeck, and Nowe, 2008) . Most applications of RL for solving optimal control problems or games online have been to finite-state systems or discrete-time dynamical systems. In this section is given a policy iteration algorithm for solving continuous-time differential games on graphs. The structure of this algorithm is used in the next section to provide online adaptive solutions for graphical games.
Best response
Theorem 2 and Corollary 1 reveal that, under assumptions 1 and 2, the systems are in interactive Nash equilibrium if, for all i N  node i selects his best response policy to his neighbors policies and the graph is strongly connected. Define the best response HJ equation as the Bellman equation (14) 
where the closed-loop matrix is 2 1 ( ) ( (0) , , ) ( (0) ) ( ) ( )
The agents are in best response to fixed policies i u  when
Then clearly ( (0) 
Policy iteration solution for graphical games
The following algorithm for the N-player distributed games is motivated by the structure of policy iteration algorithms in reinforcement learning (Bertsekas, and Tsitsiklis, 1996; Sutton, and Barto, 1998) which rely on repeated policy evaluation (e.g. solution of (14)) and policy improvement (solution of (16)). These two steps are repeated until the policy improvement step no longer changes the present policy. If the algorithm converges for every i , then it converges to the solution to HJ equations (25), and hence provides the distributed Nash equilibrium. One must note that the costs can be evaluated only in the case of admissible control policies, admissibility being a condition for the control policy which initializes the algorithm.
Algorithm 1. Policy Iteration (PI) Solution for N-player distributed games.
Step 0: Start with admissible initial policies 0 ,
Step 1: (Policy Evaluation) Solve for k i V using (14) ( ,
Step 2: (Policy Improvement) Update the N-tuple of control policies using
Go to step 1.
On convergence-End
■
The following two theorems prove convergence of the policy iteration algorithm for distributed games for two different cases. The two cases considered are the following, i) only agent i updates its policy and ii) all the agents update their policies. 
Proof:
It is clear that
Using the next control policy (42) and (43) 
Because only agent i update its control it is true that
and by integration it follows that 
and so 
■
This proof indicates that for the PI algorithm to converge, the neighbors' controls should not unduly influence the i-th node dynamics (8), and the j-th node should weight its own control j u in its performance index j J relatively more than node i weights j u in i J . These requirements are consistent with selecting the weighting matrices to obtain proper performance in the simulation examples. An alternative condition for convergence in Theorem 5 is that the norm j B should be small. This is similar to the case of weakly coupled dynamics in multi-player games in (Basar, and Olsder, 1999) .
Online solution of multi-agent cooperative games using neural networks
In this section an online algorithm for solving cooperative Hamilton-Jacobi equations (25) based on (Vamvoudakis, Lewis 2011 ) is presented. This algorithm uses the structure in the PI Algorithm 1 to develop an actor/critic adaptive control architecture for approximate online solution of (25). Approximate solutions of (40), (41) are obtained using value function approximation (VFA). The algorithm uses two approximator structures at each node, which are taken here as neural networks (NN) (Abu-Khalaf, and Lewis, 2005; Bertsekas, and Tsitsiklis, 1996; Vamvoudakis, Lewis 2010; Werbos, 1974; Werbos, 1992) . One critic NN is used at each node for value function approximation, and one actor NN at each node to approximate the control policy (41). The critic NN seeks to solve Bellman equation (40). We give tuning laws for the actor NN and the critic NN such that equations (40) and (41) are solved simultaneously online for each node. Then, the solutions to the coupled HJ equations (25) are determined. Though these coupled HJ equations are difficult to solve, and may not even have analytic solutions, we show how to tune the NN so that the approximate solutions are learned online. The next assumption is made.
Assumption 2. For each admissible control policy the nonlinear Bellman equations (14), (40) Lewis, 2005) .
Critic neural network
According to the Weierstrass higher-order approximation Theorem (Abou-Khalaf, and Lewis, 2005) there are NN weights i W such that the smooth value functions i V are approximated using a critic NN as ( ) ( ) 
Then, the Bellman equation (40) can be approximated at each step k as
It is desired to select ˆi W to minimize the square residual error
Then ˆi i W W  which solves (49) in a least-squares sense and i H e becomes small. Theorem 6 gives a tuning law for the critic weights that achieves this.
Action neural network and online learning
Define the control policy in the form of an action neural network which computes the control input (41) in the structured form 
The next results show how to tune the critic NN and actor NN in real time at each node so that equations (40) and (41) are simultaneously solved, while closed-loop system stability is also guaranteed. Simultaneous solution of (40) and (41) 
, and the tuning law for the i th actor NN as
where 1 ( ) Let the error dynamics be given by (8), and consider the cooperative game formulation in (15). Let the critic NN at each node be given by (48) and the control input be given for each node by actor NN (51). Let the tuning law for the i th critic NN be provided by (52) and the tuning law for the i th actor NN be provided by (53). Assume /( 1) 
Proof:
The proof is similar to (Vamvoudakis, 2011) .
■
Remark 1. Theorem 6 provides algorithms for tuning the actor/critic networks of the N agents at the same time to guarantee stability and make the system errors ( ) i t  small and the NN approximation errors bounded. Small errors guarantee synchronization of all the node trajectories.
Remark 2. Persistence of excitation is needed for proper identification of the value functions by the critic NNs, and nonstandard tuning algorithms are required for the actor NNs to guarantee stability. It is important to notice that the actor NN tuning law of every agent needs information of the critic weights of all his neighbors, while the critic NN tuning law of every agent needs information of the actor weights of all his neighbors, Remark 3. NN usage suggests starting with random, nonzero control NN weights in (51) in order to converge to the coupled HJ equation solutions. However, extensive simulations show that convergence is more sensitive to the persistence of excitation in the control inputs than to the NN weight initialization. If the proper persistence of excitation is not selected, the control weights may not converge to the correct values.
Remark 4. The issue of which inputs ( ) i z t to use for the critic and actor NNs needs to be addressed. According to the dynamics (8), the value functions (13), and the control inputs (16), the NN inputs at node i should consist of its own state, the states of its neighbors, and the costates of its neighbors. However, in view of (31) the costates are functions of the states. In view of the approximation capabilities of NN, it is found in simulations that it is suitable to take as the NN inputs at node i its own state and the states of its neighbors.
The next result shows that the tuning laws given in Theorem 6 guarantee approximate solution to the coupled HJ equations (25) and convergence to the Nash equilibrium. ˆi N u  converge to the approximate cooperative Nash equilibrium (Definition 2) for every i .
Proof:
The proof is similar to (Vamvoudakis, 2011) but is done only with respect to the neighbors (local information) of each agent and not with respect to all agents.
Consider the weights ˆ, Fig. 2 . Convergence of the critic parameters. Fig. 3 . Evolution of the system states and regulation. The command generator is marginally stable with poles at s j   , so it generates a sinusoidal reference trajectory. The graphical game is implemented as in Theorem 6. Persistence of excitation was ensured by adding a small exponential decreasing probing noise to the control inputs. Figure 4 shows the critic parameters converging for every agent. Figure 5 shows the synchronization of all the agents to the leader's behavior as given by the circular Lissajous plot.
Conclusion
This chapter brings together cooperative control, reinforcement learning, and game theory to solve multi-player differential games on communication graph topologies. It formulates graphical games for dynamic systems and provides policy iteration and online learning algorithms along with proof of convergence to the Nash equilibrium or best response. Simulation results show the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms.
